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punitive damages, Ellerin v.
Fairfax, clarifies the relationship between two seemingly
settled areas of law. The law,
its elements, and the standards
by which it is measured, are in
constant need ofrefinement and
interpretation. However,
whereas the standard for puni ti ve damages in a fraud action is more focused, the value

Jessica G. v. Hector M.:

MOTHER'S
UNSUCCESSFUL
PATERNITY ACTION
DOES NOT
BAR CHILD'S
SUBSEQUENT
PATERNITY ACTION.

of the court's dicta, on excessive punitive damages, is unknown. The lack of an authoritative judicial decision may further confuse the issue. Adding
another variable to the equation
does not solve the problem.
However, consideration oflegislative policy may lay the foundation for an effective judicial
tool regarding the reasonable-

ness of punitive damages
awards.
Nevertheless, given the
precarious political climate, at
the state and national level, concerning tort reform and punitive damages, it is encouraging
that the issue of excessive punitive damages has entered the
judicial discussion.
- Terrence J Daly

In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a paternity
action brought by a mother, then
dismissed with prejudice, does
not necessarily bar a subsequent
paternity action brought by the
child. Of even more importance, the court's ruling inJessica G. v. Hector M, 337 Md.
388, 653 A.2d 922 (1995)
broadly construed Family Law
Code, section 5-1038(b), to allow the modification or setting
aside of all paternity orders except declarations of paternity.
Thus, even an order terminating litigation, such as a dismissal with prejudice, can be
set aside and the paternity issue
relitigated by the child's subsequent paternity action.
In March 1985, Joyce
G. and Hector M. had an intimate relationship. In December of that same year, Joyce
gave birth to Jessica G. Soon
after Jessica's birth, Joyce filed
a paternity action against Hector in the Circuit Court for
Harford County. Blood tests of
the three parties indicated that
there was a 99.97% chance that

Hector was Jessica's father.
Nonetheless, Hector refused to
admit paternity. Aftertwoyears
of prolonged discovery, Joyce
asked to stop the paternity action. A consent order to dismiss the action with prejudice
was drafted and signed by all
parties but Joyce. When the
Assistant State's Attorney explained the meaning of with
prejudice, Joyce refused to sign
the order. However, in March
1988, the State's Attorney docketed the consent order.
Joyce tried repeatedly
to continue the paternity action.
She filed another paternity suit
in the Family Court of New
York. The New York court
dismissed the action, relying
solely on the 1988 Harford
County dismissal with prejudice. While Joyce was pursuing various avenues of appeal,
Jessica filed a paternity action
against Hector in the Circuit
Court for Harford County.
Hectorresponded by filing a motion to dismiss Jessica's action based on the doctrineofresjudicata. Thecircuit
court found that Joyce was rep-
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resenting Jessica's interests in
the original paternity suit. Thus,
it held that Joyce's original suit
barred Jessica's subsequent paternity suit. Jessica appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to the intennediate
court's consideration of the issue.
The court of appeals
began its analysis by noting that
other jurisdictions have ruled
on the issue of whether a child
can bring a paternity action after the mother's unsuccessful
action. Usually such actions
were decided on res judicata
principles. Jessica, 337 Md.
at 395,653A.2dat926. Noticing a split in authority among
thesejurisdictions, the court explored the alternative conclusions.
Initially, the court discussed the jurisdictions supporting the conclusion that any unsuccessful paternity action
brought by a mother has a preclusive effect on any subsequent
paternity action brought by the
child. Id. at 397, 653 A.2d at
927. The court noted the rationale for barring a child's subsequent action, as espoused by
the Indiana Court of Appeals in
T.R. v. A. W by Pearson, 470
N.E.2d 95, 97 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984). That court stated four
reasons for not allowing a child
to relitigate a mother's unsuccessful paternity action. To
begin, allowing successive paternity actions would undermine the court's goal of a final
judgment. Secondly, courts dis-

courage inconsistent judgments. Relitigation of the paternity action would invite incongruous results. A third concern voiced by the Indiana court
was the need to avoid harassing
litigation. Finally, the court
noted that failing to apply the
doctrine of res judicata would
result in wasted time and court
costs. Id.
Next, the court of appeals analyzed the jurisdictions
adopting the opposite conclusion. The majority of these
decisions involved prior paternity actions where the merits of
the case were never actually
litigated. Id. at399,653 A.2dat
928. In quoting Johnson v.
Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871, 877
(Minn. 1989), the court of appeals noted that if the child's
specific interests were not addressed on the merits in the first
action, a subsequent paternity
action was available to that
child. Id. at 400, 653 A.2d at
928.
However, the court of
appeals noted that it need not
address the issue of a factual
adjudication. Id. Rather, in the
case sub judice, the resolution
turned on the construction of
Family Law Code, section 51038(b): "Except for a declaration of paternity, the court may
modify or set aside any order or
part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just
and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child." Id.
In construing the statute, the court turned to the words
ofsection5-1038(b). Thecourt

detennined that the statute was
clear and the intent obvious.
Thus, the court interpreted this
section to allow "a paternity
court to modify or set aside any
prior order where just and proper and in the best interests ofthe
child, regardless of the usual
rules of finality applicable to
non-paternity cases." Id. at401,
653 A.2dat929. The court held
that the order which dismissed
Joyce's paternity action with
prejudice was exactly the type
of order contemplated by the
statute. Since the prior order
was dismissed by the State's
Attorney over Joyce's objection and blood tests showed a
99.97% probability of paternity, the court found it to be just
and proper, and in the best interests of Jessica to allow her
subsequent paternity action to
proceed. Id. at 402,653 A.2d at
929.
The court of appeals
bolstered its opinion by stating
that the holding reached was
justified, even in the absence of
Family Law Code, section 51038(b). First, the majority of
other jurisdictions would not
bar a child's subsequent paternity action if the mother's original action was dismissed without a factual finding on the issue of paternity. Id. Furthermore, to hold otherwise would
directly contradict the public
policy enunciated in the paternity statute. That is, to promote
the best interests ofillegitimate
children and impose the responsibility of parenthood on the
parents of such children. Id.
However, thecourtcau-

tioned that the analysis of the
case sub judice cannot end with
the holding. Noting that the
New York dismissal with prejudice was based on the Harford
County dismissal with prejudice and not a factual determination ofthe paternity issue, the
court ofappeals turned to Maryland's conflict oflaws. It found
that the res judicata effect given
to the New York dismissal with
prejudice must be the same effect that New York would have
given the judgment. A brief
review of New York law revealed aholding consistent with
the holding reached by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Id. at 404, 653 A.2d at 930.
Thus, the Maryland court honored the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Id. at 405,653 A.2d at
931.
In the concurring opinion, Justices Eldridge and Raker stated that section 5-1007 of

the Family Law Code (exempting paternity actions from rules
and statutes dealing with procedure unless such application is
practical under the circumstances) provided enough authority
for not applying res judicata to
the case sub judice. Id. at 40910,653 A.2d at 933. Furthermore, the justices agreed with
jurisdictions which hold that res
judicata does not bar a paternity
action brought byachild subsequent to an unsuccessful action
brought by the mother. Id. at
411,653 A.2d at 933-34. The
justices noted that the child has
different interests than a parent
in paternity actions. Id. at 411,
653 A.2d at 934. Thus the
parties are not in privity and res
judicata cannot apply. Id.
In Jessica G. v. Hector
M, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland explicitly refrained
from holding that a child's subsequent paternity action is not

barred by a previous, unsuccessful paternity action. However, the court left open an avenue of relief. Through a broad
interpretation of Family Law
Code, section 5-1038(b), the
court can offer relief as it sees
fit. This decision is a godsend
to the children of those mothers
who are unsuccessful in their
paternity actions. As long as
the order in the original paternity action is not a declaration of
paternity, the child has a chance
at maintaining his or her own
paternity action against the putative father. While this might
appear to be a decision that will
open the floodgates of litigation, in reality, it merely offers
the fatherless child a more equitable chance at initiating a paternity action.
- Kristin Heller Woolam

